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VIRTUES, GIFTS AND TALENTS: PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC TRADITIONS 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
In European intellectual history, gifts and talents have been a prominent topic of 
philosophical and theological reflection for more than 2000 years. In Aristotle, a gift is 
understood as something "given without recompense" (Topics 125a18). Gifts were thus 
distinguished from the economic exchange of buying and selling as well as from earning by 
means of human labor. The practice of giving and receiving gifts and favours was a very 
important social condition in Roman society, as the extensive treatise De beneficiis by the 
Stoic thinker Seneca shows. For Seneca, both the benefactor and the recipient of the gifts are 
under various moral obligations concerning the treatment of the gifts given and received. 
 
Jesus and Paul 
 
   In religious traditions, in particular Christianity, we can observe how the discourse on gifts 
became internalized and applied not only to material things and social benefits, but also to 
mental faculties and human skills. Jesus' parable on talents which the master gives to his 
servants in order that they may increase their value (Matt 25) takes the material world as its 
point of departure. It is rather easy, however, to interpret the parable so that it refers to the 
different individual skills and gifts possessed by different people. A talent, be it a material 
commodity or a mental skill, needs to be nurtured and properly increased and circulated. 
Developing and circulating the gifts received is rewarding and morally laudable, whereas 
their neglect is a vice. In Jesus' parable, a modern interpreter easily sees the vice of idleness, 
but at least as important for many Christians was the vice of ingratitude, the lack of respect 
towards the giver of the gift. In hiding the talent in the ground, the bad servant does not 
receive and engage the gift properly. Thus he displays a lack of respect or ingratitude. 
   In the letters of Apostle Paul the topic of giving and receiving gifts becomes internalized 
and is transformed into the theological notion of charism. Charisms are gifts given by God. 
They are not a form of reciprocal exchange based on merits, gratitude or good expectations, 
but they are based on grace, kharis. Thus they aim at expressing a unilateral and free gift of 
God. The charisms express themselves as "fruits of the Spirit", that is, as attitudes, emotions, 
social and mental skills which resemble classical virtues, for instance as love, joy, patience, 
generosity and self-control (Gal 5:22). Paul speaks of spiritual gifts (1 Cor 12:1-11) which 
often pertain to different individuals in different fashion, although they manifest the same 
spirit. Interestingly, Paul's list of such gifts begins with the mental skills of wisdom and 
knowledge (1 Cor 12:8) which are given to some but not all people as a gift. Paul is not, 
however, advocating the intellectual charisms as the ultimate gifts, but he rather praises those 
charisms which belong to the social capital of bonding and bridging among different people. 
It is love that summarizes the gift of social capital (1 Cor 13).  
 
Thomas Aquinas 
 
   The European academic vocabulary concerning virtues, gifts and talents was for centuries 
shaped by the classical work of the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa 
theologiae, Aquinas works out a synthesis of classical Greek philosophy, in particular 
Aristotle, and Christianity. With regard to human skills and talents, Aristotle was not 
altogether easy to reconcile with the tradition of Jesus and, in particular, Paul. For Aristotle 
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(in Ethica Nicomachea and De anima), human intellectual capacities and skills are above all 
virtues which emerge as a result of constant exercise and good educational training. Aristotle 
further holds that the soul is the formal cause of human nature. According to this view, all 
souls are similar and therefore lack positive individual differences. 
    Aquinas does not completely reconcile these discrepancies between the Aristotelian and 
Christian models of human soul. He rather constructs a complex hierarchy of virtues and gifts 
and their many-sided interplay. Both for Aristotle and Aquinas, virtues emerge as a result of 
exercise and learning. Unlike virtues, gifts are for Aquinas directly given or infused into us. 
Gifts are spirits which are "in us by divine inspiration". Inspiration is a motion coming from 
outside; thus it is the extrinsic principle of human movement. The virtues which emerge as a 
result of training form the human person as she is driven by her intrinsic principle, human 
reason. (Summa theol. II/1 q68 a1; Saarinen 2005, 127). 
   Without going deeper into the meaning of the terms "intrinsic" and "extrinsic", one can say 
that the term intrinsic refers to the inner grasp, rational human understanding and intellectual 
motivation. "Extrinsic" alludes to the powers which externally and materially move the 
person. Extrinsic causes can be described as a capacity or force, but also as the purpose and 
drive towards some goal. For instance, in this event of my lecturing to you, the intrinsic cause 
of my activity is that I have studied history, find it interesting and believe to understand it, 
whereas the extrinsic cause is that God, or perhaps evolution, has bestowed me with such 
capacities which enable me to understand historical texts and give me a sense of fulfilment or 
satisfaction in performing this task. 
    For Thomas Aquinas both the virtues and the gifts thus refer to the same thing in humans, 
namely human movement or activity, as its intrinsic and extrinsic disposition. Human 
activity, be it physical or intellectual, is both autonomous and heteronomous at the same time. 
The gifts highlight the heteronomous reality. At the same time they are, as dispositions, 
human properties which go together with the intrinsic, reason-based virtues. In this way 
Aquinas builds a gift-based theory of human activity on top of Aristotle's virtue-based view.  
   It is important to see in which precise sense the gifts are heteronomous. For Thomas, the 
talents are given through inspiration and they refer to the extrinsic principle of movement or 
activity. In concrete human action, however, gifts go together with the intrinsic and 
autonomous virtues. In this sense, the educational value of both virtues and gifts is similar: 
both dispose and prepare a person for the right conduct. In a concrete situation it is difficult to 
distinguish whether one acts in an excellent manner as a result of being gifted or as a result of 
hard work and exercise. Interestingly, however, the Thomistic discussion on virtues and gifts 
elaborates a clear conceptual distinction between achieved and non-achieved features of 
human conduct.  
   For those of us who are not so interested in theology or history it may be relevant to see 
that the theological discussion on charisms has in this manner worked out a basic distinction 
which may continue to be interesting, irrespective of its theological background. We may 
replace the phrase "God-given gift" or "inspired" by other phrases like "given by nature" or 
"evolutionary" and by so doing reaffirm the theoretically important distinction between 
achieved and non-achieved or between autonomous (learning and choosing) and 
heteronomous (genetic and environmental) aspects of human conduct. 
 
Roman Catholicism 
 
   The Roman Catholic educational thinking is largely based on the Thomistic interplay of 
virtues and gifts. Hard work and training are necessary in order that the virtues can emerge in 
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an Aristotelian manner. The intellectual virtue of understanding belongs essentially to this 
training, since human reason can be educated to know the intrinsic causes and thus learn 
autonomy and inner motivation. At the same time, it is also important to identify and nurture 
the gifts given to each individual. Through their various gifts people can develop their 
particular personality, but they also realize that their behavior is not only autonomous, but 
also extrinsic and heteronomous in the sense that given and non-achieved realities steer their 
activities. 
   One influential corollary of the Thomistic synthesis of virtues and gifts relates to the 
increased individualism in late medieval and early modern Europe. The idea of individual 
talents or inspiration pays significantly more attention to the differences among individual 
persons than the classical virtue ethics of Aristotle. In the Thomistic context it is possible to 
think that some few individuals were extraordinaly talented, in other words, that God has 
bestowed abundant spiritual gifts upon them. A particularly well-known example of this view 
concerns the investigation of saintly deeds and the appointment of saints in the Roman 
Catholic Church.  
   From the 16th century until today, special rules apply to the investigation of candidates to 
be appointed to the status of sainthood. A special criterion is that the saints should have 
displayed the so-called heroic virtue in their lifetime. The heroic virtue is, theologically, a 
special and extraordinary gift which God bestows on some exemplary Christians. With this 
extraordinary talent the saints are able to perform heroic actions which are beyond the reach 
of ordinary people. The extensive theoretical discussion of the spiritual talents of saints has 
led not only to the positive appreciation of human differences but also to the elaboration of 
theoretical criteria as well as to the empirical and documented measurement of individual 
human talents. 
 
The Protestant Reformation 
 
   The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century gave new directions to this discussion. 
Since the Protestants taught that salvation was not due to our own works but to faith, they 
were often critical of Aristotelian virtue ethics and tended to regard it as a problematic 
self-righteousness. The idea of God-given gifts enjoyed a high respect among Protestants. 
God gives everything as a gift. We should therefore regard all our belongings, even our 
mental skills, as aspects of this total donation. Heteronomy and gift-language were thus 
emphasized while autonomy and virtue ethics became downplayed.  
   At the same time, the Protestant Reformation was an inherently complex phenomenon. 
Martin Luther and his companions advocated schools very strongly and invested greatly in the 
education of children and ordinary people. In practice, moral, intellectual and practical 
formation enjoyed a high popularity. Because the Reformation abolished the veneration of 
saints, the saints were no longer models for the display of God-given talents. According to 
Protestantism, all people are saints and can thus display special gifts in their earthly vocation. 
The educational thinking which emerged out of this complex phenomenon was a combination 
of old and new ideas, a new combination of the gifts and virtues. 
   The leading educationalist of the Reformation was Luther's colleague Philipp Melanchthon 
(1497-1560). Let it be mentioned briefly that the Lutheran Reformer of Finland, Mikael 
Agricola, was Melanchthon's pupil in Wittenberg and that the founding of schools in Sweden 
and Finland followed Melanchthon's ideas. The same development occurred in many 
European countries in which Melanchthon's textbooks were read in the Protestant 
universities.  
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   In his psychological and pedagogical writings, Melanchthon offers a moderated version of 
Luther's theological insights. In fact, he takes up terminology which was also present in 
Catholicism. Following Luther, he says that Aristotle's virtue ethics does not give a true 
picture of human activity. But the ideas of virtue, exercise and training of human reason can 
nevertheless be successfully applied in many less theological branches of human education. 
   Melanchthon's own theological picture of human nature proceeds from the idea that human 
knowledge is based on the so-called natural notions, a set of fundamental ideas regarding 
human reason, self-consciousness, moral truths and also the existence of God. Theologically, 
the natural notions are remnants of the idea of the person as being made in the image of God. 
They are thus part of the givenness of man as a created being and in that sense gifts. In our 
world, these gifts appear as lights which enlighten the search for reason in its formation. 
Thus, although human reason in many ways operates in accordance with Aristotelian 
philosophy, it is fundamentally dependent on the natural light given from above as divine gift. 
At this fundamental level, Melanchthon's educational and ethical thinking emphasises the 
necessity of gifts even more strongly than Thomas Aquinas's view. 
   Although the Protestant Reformation abolished the veneration of saints, the underlying 
topic of extraordinary individual talents remains a much-discussed topic in Protestantism. 
Melanchthon is keenly interested in the topic of heroic virtue. For him it is not connected 
with saints but with those people upon whom God has bestowed spiritual gifts in an 
extraordinarily generous manner. Some gifted people excel in courageous deeds, others in the 
life of faith. But there are also heroic talents in arts and sciences, like Josquin des Prez in 
music, Ovid in poetry and Archimedes in mathematics. Their talents are natural notions and 
movements which have been given by God as special inspiration (Melanchthon 1893, 15-16). 
 
The Heroic Virtue 
 
   In his description of highest artistic and intellectual virtues Melanchthon follows models 
found in late medieval and Renaissance philosophy. But he is original in the great and 
systematic emphasis which he gives on different sorts of individual talents. In his psychology 
Melanchthon stresses the so-called inventive power of the human mind, a special faculty 
which is operative in sciences and arts when discoveries are made and creative work realized. 
The inventive power is God's gift which is distributed among humans in an unequal manner 
so that some people are more innovative or creative than others (Melanchthon 1961, 
337-339). Because of this psychological doctrine, individual differences and capacities also 
play a significant role in educational considerations. 
   We may perhaps say that the Protestant Reformation in a way secularised and 
democraticised the discussion on saints and their extraordinary gifts. Protestant academic 
textbooks became more interested in the extraordinary talents of other classes of people, like 
extraordinary rulers, artists and intellectuals. Lutheran ethical textbooks of the 16th and 17th 
centuries often contain long lists of individual people who have excelled in warfare, religion, 
arts and sciences (Saarinen 1990). These works prepare for the emergence of the idea of 
genius in the Enlightenment. They also contain a more or less standard set of questions 
related to individual talent, for instance regarding the issue of whether or not women can 
display heroic virtues.  
   We may trace this development from the early dissertations of the University of Helsinki, 
founded in 1640. One of the first dissertations of our university, De virtute heroica by Johan 
Wassenius from the year 1648, asks this very question concerning the possibility of 
extraordinary talents in women. Employing Melanchthon and other early Protestant thinkers, 
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Wassenius answers as follows: 
Both in earlier times and in our days many women have been examples of heroic 
virtue. Those include Judith, Semiramis, Jael, ... Margareta of Denmark and Elisabeth 
of England. And nobody can deny that our own country has also produced amazonic 
heroic virtues. A living example is provided in our excellent and powerful Queen 
Christina, from whom the heroic virtue radiates into the whole world. (Wassenius 
1648, n.p., my translation) 
   Although Wassenius certainly has political reasons to praise Christina, the founder of the 
Finnish university, it is also well known that Christina was exceptionally learned and did not 
only set an example of talent as a monarch, but also and perhaps predominantly as a woman 
of letters and an intellectual. She was thus also an example of extraordinary intellectual talent. 
In spite of their stress on education, all Protestant writers underlined that the heroic virtue is 
always given from above as a spiritual gift. 
   
Autonomy and Heteronomy 
 
   From our contemporary perspective, it may seem somewhat odd that the creative capacity 
of the talented individual is in major Christian traditions not regarded as being a fruit of one's 
autonomous self. It is rather the expression of a gift bestowed upon the person by another 
agent, namely God. In this observation we meet a fundamental ambivalence which is inherent 
in concepts like "gift" and "inspiration". On the one hand, these concepts depict the very 
individuality of a certain person because they identify such traits of character which are not 
universal but distinguish the person from the larger group. In this way they are 
identity-constituting concepts. 
   On the other hand, the description of a certain trait as gift or as inspiration expresses a 
heteronomy, namely the issue that someone else, a giver or a spirit, has donated the talent 
under discussion. In this second sense the concepts of gift and inspiration detach the person 
from this specific trait of character and ascribe it to another subject. Thus the concept of gift 
also tends to reduce a person's identity. One may wonder whether this twofold phenomenon 
expresses a merely historical ambivalence.  
   Today's scientists probably say that they do not postulate a God or any other external giver 
who or which would in some way represent another subject or an extrinsic foundation of 
heteronomy. Today's scientists are only measuring certain abilities and in any case they do not 
postulate more than one carrier of these abilities within a person. On the other hand, at least a 
layperson is tempted to think that the following example could be plausible. Let there be two 
groups of schoolchildren who come from similar surroundings and have received a similar 
training in mathematics. But the first group is significantly better in maths than the second 
one. Could it not be that the first group has some kind of "talent" which cannot be traced to 
their intrinsically conscious mind but is rather due to some kind of "given" ability? 
   Continuing this line of thought, one may argue that, at least in some circles of genetic and 
brain research, people employ words like "genes", "evolutionary outcome" or "brain capacity" 
in the same way as Paul and Aquinas use the phrase "spiritual gifts", namely, as a 
quasi-explanation of some rather mysterious differences among individuals. In all these 
words and phrases, the subject in question is not autonomously in control of the properties 
which he or she posssesses. 
 
The Paradox of Free Gifts 
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    This remark leads me to my second area of interest, which is the theoretical discussion on 
the gift in contemporary philosophy and sociology. Although this area is closely linked to the 
history of gifts and virtues in the Western tradition, it is a distinct philosophical topic and as 
such perhaps less theological than the first one. 
   Many sociologists of the 20th century like to argue that there is no such thing as free 
lunch. Every gift is conditioned by some reciprocity and thus there is no real reason to speak 
of unilateral or free gifts. Bourdieu, for instance, defines gifts as exchanges in which the 
recipient after some delay gives back something different. During the last twenty years, this 
view has been challenged by other thinkers, like Jacques Godbout (1999), who argues that 
genuine gifts may be possible and distinguishable from economic exchange. At the same time 
he is ready to admit, however, that the notion of free gift contains many conceptual problems. 
   I will reflect on this discussion, because the point has often been made in it that all 
language based on the notion of gift, if only metaphorically, runs the risk of becoming 
self-contradictory. Thus even other concepts which employ the idea of gift, for instance 
forgiveness or altruism, may lead in complications. Could it be that the discussion on talents 
is also hampered by these complications? In order to address this question, some description 
of the philosophy of gifts is necessary. 
   The basic problem with ordinary free gifts is that, as soon as the recipient knows the item 
to be a free gift, he or she feels indebted and pays back at least a sense of gratitude. But a free 
gift should not involve any indebtedness or gratitude since it is supposed to be unilateral. 
Therefore, already the identification of a gift as gift in a way destroys the gift. This semantic 
problem was already observed by Seneca and Thomas Aquinas who admitted that a gift is not 
merely unilateral but entails a proper amount of gratitude. But then someone may claim that 
the phenomenon of gift is inevitably reduced to the business of buying and selling gratitude. 
Therefore, genuine gifts are impossible. 
   One strategy of solving this problem, applied by many philosophers, is to detach the giver 
from the gift. A genuine gift needs to be anonymous, that is, the recipient must not know who 
the giver is. Some philosophers add that even the giver needs to give in such a manne that he 
never comes to know the recipient. Donating blood would be an example of a genuine gift in 
these two senses. If I receive a blood transfusion, I may be grateful for this precious gift. But 
there is no interpersonal indebtedness towards anybody and, in this sense, the gift is freely 
given and received.  
 
The Paradox of Being Gifted 
 
    Perhaps this example bears some resemblance to our discussion of talents and high 
abilities. A talented person may feel gratitude for her talent without being indebted in any 
way. There is no personal benefactor towards whom she should show respect because of the 
talent inherent in her. She has received her talent, metaphorically speaking, from an 
anonymous donor. 
   I have not seen anywhere in literature the discussion on free gifts having been applied to 
the phenomenon of talents and giftedness. It may nevertheless be fruitful to think about 
possible analogies and applications. It may be the case that the above-mentioned ambivalence 
between heteronomy and autonomy, or the issue of a tacitly presupposed quasi-giver, are 
related to the conceptual paradoxes of free gifts (For the following, cf. Saarinen 2005, 
126-131). 
    The phrase "being gifted" is many-sided and complex. When teachers or other people say 
today that somebody is gifted, they do not mean that the talents in question would have 
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literally come from some external source or giver. On the contrary, the phrase is often 
employed in order to say the opposite, that somebody is inherently bright, that he or she 
possesses some valuable properties from the beginning. The gift has not been given by the 
teacher, but it is already there when the school begins its work. A talent needs education and 
nurture, but we do not normally think that the notion of talents involves a transfer of 
something to an ordinary person so that the person from a certain point on can be called 
"gifted". On the contrary, when we say that this child is gifted, we mean that the child 
possesses something  from the beginning and therefore does not need as much teacher-given 
training as other children. Being gifted is presented as an autonomous or inherent feature of 
the person. 
   While the phenomenon of being gifted in this way downplays the aspect of an external 
giver, it highlights another aspect of the classical gift at the same time. A gift is neither earned 
through hard work, nor is it a reward for your activity. A gift comes to you, or exists in you, 
as a free gift. A child who, without training, learns to read at the age of four is gifted in this 
sense. The child possesses a gift which allows for rapid development of new skills. This gift 
may be of genetic or biological origin, but it is not achieved. The child simply has it.  
   This second aspect of "being gifted" resembles some classical features of the theological 
gift. If the first aspect showed a certain autonomy of being gifted, the second aspect displays a 
heteronomy. The gift in question is now heteronomous in the sense that we cannot control 
and manipulate it. It is not of our doing that this child is so clever. It would also be strange to 
say that the child himself or herself has caused this state of affairs. The child in question 
enjoys these high abilities without much subjective effort. The gifts are thus, in some 
metaphorical sense, "put into" the child by some external but anonymous giver, and in this 
metaphorical sense they are heteronomous. 
   Our contemporary way of speaking about "being gifted" thus employs a dialectic between 
autonomy and heteronomy. This dialectic resembles, but is not identical with, the paradoxes 
of the so-called free gift. A gifted person has received a gift which, by definition, is not his or 
her own achievement but something for which he or she perhaps should feel indebted or at 
least grateful. At the same time, the state of being gifted is an inherent feature and 
autonomous resource of this person. The historical discussion, in spite of Christian 
heteronomy, also emphasizes autonomy. Seneca stresses that the recipient of the gift should 
not feel too much indebted or too grateful but should embrace the gift as his property without 
hesitation. In Jesus' parable of the talents, the man who hid the talent in the ground 
disregarded the autonomous ownership. But this lack of autonomous engagement was 
considered to be a vice. 
   In both historical cases, exaggerated heteronomy and alienation from the gift are criticized. 
What is attempted is a balanced paradox or dialectic between autonomy and heteronomy. 
Maybe such a balanced dialectic would also be fruitful in the understanding and nurture of the 
phenomenon of high ability. 
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